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For a biological attack to occur, three
elements must be in place: a vulnerable target, a
person or group with the capability to attack, and
the intent (by the perpetrator) to carry out such
an attack. Much of what can be done to limit the
capability and the intent of potential attackers is
already on its way to being accomplished. The
most work, and the highest return on
investment, involve reducing the vulnerability of
the United States to both intentional and
unintentional pathogen releases.
Vulnerability to Biological Attack
Among weapons of mass destruction,
biological weapons are more destructive than
chemical weapons, including nerve gas. In
certain circumstances, biological weapons can be
as devastating as nuclear onesa few kilograms
of anthrax can kill as many people as a
Hiroshima-size nuclear weapon (Figure).
The United States is unprepared to deal with
a biological attack. Over the past several years,
preparedness strides have been made, especially
in the largest cities. However, much of the
needed equipment is not available. Pathogen
sensors are not in place to detect that a biological
attack has taken place. New medicines are
needed. In combating terrorist attacks, treat-
ment is a more practical approach than
prevention; yet many biological agents are
extremely difficult to treat
with existing medicines once
the symptoms appear. In
addition, many of the most
important prophylactic drugs
have limited shelf lives and
cannot be stockpiled. More-
over, their effectiveness could
be compromised by a sophis-
ticated attacker.
Local emergency medical
response capability is lim-
ited. A number of localities
define a mass casualty
event as one with more than
a dozen casualties, far fewer
than an intentional biological
release could cause. Emer-
gency room capacity in major
cities can be overwhelmed all
too quickly by more common
emergencies. Much emer-
gency medical capability is
also located in downtown
areas that may be targeted
for attack.
The National Disaster Medical System has
voluntary access to approximately 100,000
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hospital beds across the country to cope with a
large-scale medical emergency. However, not all
of those beds have the specialized means for
patient respiration and supportive therapy that
may be needed in a crisis. Such equipment is not
available in large numbers (>5,000), even from
deployable field hospital Department of Defense
war stocks (1). Further, current federal plans
favor not evacuating injured people from the
affected area but may relocate patients who were
already in hospitals to free up local bed space (2).
This indicates that localities need to increase
their own capabilities. The federal government
will augment local efforts, not supersede them.
Steps are being taken to decrease U.S.
vulnerability to biological attack. Technical
research is being supported, needed medicines
and vaccines will be acquired, and emergency
response templates are being developed. One of
the reforms was setting up the Office of State and
Local Domestic Preparedness Support within
the Department of Justice. The office has
developed a set of objective criteria that measure
domestic readiness to deal with an attack by a
weapon of mass destruction. No locality has yet
qualified for the top rankingbeing prepared for
such a crisis (3).
Perpetrator Capability
Biological weapons can range in lethality
from salmonella used to temporarily incapacitate
to super bubonic plague engineered for mass
casualities. Biological weapons include ricin,
which an extremist may use to assassinate a
single local official, as well as pathogens with
high transmissibility and broad potential
impact. Biological agents may be used to kill or
disable humans or to attack plants or animals to
harm a nations economy. Given that broad
scope, biological attacks have already taken
place and continue to be a distinct probability for
the foreseeable future (4). However, of greatest
concern is the capability to deliver a sizable
lethal attack against a population center.
Technical Capability
Making reliable biological weapons requires
art as well as science. Such weapons are not
readily adaptable to cookbook type recipes that
can be implemented by novices. Nevertheless,
technical expertise and sophistication about
biological processes have become much more
widespread. Moreover, even though technical
expertise is required to produce high-quality,
military-grade biological weapons and reliable
means of dissemination, terrorist applications
are less demanding.
Making biological weapons requires sample
cultures; the means to grow, purify, and stabilize
them; and the means to reliably disseminate
them. All these tasks pose substantial but not
insurmountable challenges. More than 1,500
biological culture libraries worldwide, as well as
numerous research institutions and natural
sources, maintain sample cultures (5). Growth
media and fermenters to multiply the sample
cultures are widely available. Purifying, concen-
trating, and stabilizing agents is demanding and
dangerous but not a great technical challenge.
Freeze-drying the product and milling it into
particles of a uniform respirable size requires
even more technical capabilities. A state sponsor
may be needed to do it, although companies and
institutes regularly spray dry and mill commer-
cial microbes. Moreover, a respirable aerosol of
germs can be achieved through other high-
pressure devices.
Biological production and weapon-producing
facilities can be small, inexpensive, and
inconspicuous. Equipment to develop biological
arms may have legitimate commercial and
research purposes, as well as nefarious ones.
Unlike nuclear weapons, biological weapons do
not require unique ingredients that are ready
objects of arms control.
Institutional Capability
Depending on their sophistication, terrorist
groups may or may not have the capability to
build broad-impact biological weapons. How-
ever, most nations have the capability to make
biological weapons. Some 18 nations are believed
to have done so, including the former Soviet
Union and several nations the State Department
lists as supporting terrorism.
Intention to Use Biological Weapons
Why would anyone wish to use biological
weapons? A leading entity with a motive to
perpetrate a biological attack could be a rogue
state as an act of clandestine warfare. The very
strength of a superpower may provide an
incentive to adversaries to challenge this
strength unconventionally.
If a rogue regime were to mount such an
unconventional asymmetric attack, they might507 Vol. 5, No. 4, JulyAugust 1999 Emerging Infectious Diseases
Special Issue
choose biological weapons because their extreme
destructive potential is concentrated in a
relatively small and unremarkable package with
virtually no detectable sensor signature. Be-
cause of the agents incubation period, the
perpetrators might be gone before anyone knew
that an attack had been made. Finally, biological
agents, unlike  ballistic missiles, lend themselves
to clandestine dissemination.
Warfare itself may be becoming more total
and losing much of its political character in some
situations. Biological weapons, which kill people
but leave infrastructure intact, could become the
poor mans neutron bomb.
In the past, the essence of terrorism was to
make a political statement through violence. It
was a political act designed to influence an
audience. Levels of violence were carefully
calculated so as to draw attention but not to be so
high as to alienate supporters or trigger
overwhelming response from authorities. That
continues to be a main theme of conventional
terrorism. However, in so-called postmodern or
superterrorism, the aim is to maximize the
number of casualties (6). This reflects a shift in
the goal of the terrorists, from trying to make a
political statement through violence to maximiz-
ing damage to the target as an end in itself. Such
terrorists may be motivated by ethnic or
religious considerations, among others (7).
Even conventional terrorism tends to
escalate levels of violence to keep garnering
attention. The threat of biological weapons
imparts high levels of fear that may make them
desirable to perpetrators who wish to terrorize,
even more than to kill. Threats have to become
increasingly credible after the initial shock of
specious threats has diminished. Even a minor
biological attack, made to demonstrate credibil-
ity, could have a disproportionate impact. Thus,
a certain subset of terrorists may be motivated to
commit mass casualty terrorism, including
biological terrorism.
Nonintentional Pathogen Releases
Certain kinds of biological assaults can be
predicted with even higher confidence than
bioterrorist attacks. Stephen Morse, Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency, has said
that Mother Nature is the greatest terrorist.
Since infectious diseases were widely dismissed
as a world health threat some 30 years ago,
nature has loosed some 30 new or reemerging
infectious diseases on the world (Table) (8). An
influenza pandemic was averted 2 years ago by
the alert and energetic actions of epidemiologists
in Hong Kong and around the world. Slower
reactions might have permitted the pathogens
genes to shuffle among human and avian
infections to make the flu strain readily
transmissible from person to person. Multidrug-
resistant tuberculosis is increasing rapidly in
Russia in part because of lack of adequate
antibiotics (9). More health challenges are
almost certainly in store. Causes contributing to
emerging disease outbreaks (overcrowding,
deforestation, airline travel) will likely continue
(9).
Health security and national security needs
overlap. If the United States prepares to confront
and defeat intentional human releases of
pathogens, we will be better prepared for the
unpredictable but robust threats likely to occur
from nature. For emergency medical response,
patients need rapid and efficacious treatment,
whether the source of an outbreak of disease is
intentional or natural. Medical research needs
drugs that treat disease after symptoms become
apparent. Such drugs might target common
features of disease (10), e.g., inflammation
cascade and toxic shock. Aerosol challenge is also
typical of both military threats and other
airborne pathogens; vaccines that enhance
mucosal immunity may mitigate them. Expres-
sion of specific genes that may be critical and
unique to a number of pathogens might one day
be inhibited by medicine.
Effective and safe multipurpose and specific
drug treatments would help in the battle against
both naturally occurring and intentional
releases of infectious disease. Through advanced
biotechnology, we could begin to reverse the
offense-defense mismatch that now greatly
favors disease over cure.
Conclusions
Vulnerability and capability, two prerequi-
sites of bioterrorism, are in place. Enhancing
emergency medical preparedness and support-
ing advanced pharmaceutical research for
multivalent drugs, among other measures, will
help us deter and defeat deliberate and
naturally occurring pathogen releases, as well
as increase the general health and well-being
of the population. The intention of potential
attackers is difficult to manage. Therefore,508 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 5, No. 4, JulyAugust 1999
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limiting our vulnerability is the most
promising way to prevent or mitigate biological
attacks on the United States.
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Table. New and reemerging viruses (8)
Viruses Date    Family Comments
New
Human herpesvirus 6 (HHV-6) 1986 Herpesvirus
Human herpesvirus 7 (HHV-7) 1990 Herpesvirus
GS viruses (hepatitis) 1994 Flavivirus
Human herpesvirus 8 (HHV-8) 1995 Herpesvirus
Reemerging




Equine morbillivirus 1994 Morbillivirus Emerged in Brisbane, Australia. Causes
  acute respiratory disease with high
  mortality in horses. Believed to cause a
  fatal encephalitis in humans.
Hantaan group Bunyaviruses
Phocine distemper 1987 Morbillivirus Caused death rates in seals in the Baltic
  and North Sea. Similar viruses
  subsequently recognized as responsible
  for porpoise and dolphin deaths
  in the Irish Sea and the Mediterranean.
Rabbit calicivirus disease 1985 Calicivirus Emerged in China, spread naturally
  /Viral hemorrhagic   through UK and Europe. Introduced to
  disease   Wardang Island off the coast of South
  Australia to test potential for rabbit
  population control, accidentally spread to
  mainland decimating rabbit
  populations.
Rift Valley fever Bunyaviruses
Tomato spotted wilt Bunyavirus
Whitefly-transmitted Geminivirus
  geminiviruses (group III
  geminiviruses)